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"[Wiar captivity is neither revenge nor punishment, but solely protec-
tive custody."
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 7, 2011, President Barack Obama signed Executive
Order 13,567 to establish a process for the periodic review of the deten-
tion status of detainees held at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station in
Cuba.2 The Order applies to detainees being held in continued law of
war detention, and it defines the standard for such detention.3 The
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has expressed outrage over
the Order's standard for continued law of war detention, exclaiming
that it "institutionalizes [unlawful] indefinite detention,"4 and several
media outlets5 and scholarS6 have agreed. This paper presents a
straightforward response to these claims in defense of the legality of
the Executive Order's standard for continued law of war detention.
This paper will show the inaccuracy of these claims by explaining how
the Order creates a higher legal standard for detention than is re-
quired by the laws of war and the 2001 Authorization for Use of
Military Force (AUMF).
As a preliminary matter, it is important to note that this paper
is narrowly focused on the issue of the Order's standard for continued
law of war detention. It does not address other legal issues raised by
other provisions in the Order. For example, the Order applies to two
1. Decision of Nuremberg Military Tribunal, reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 229
(1947).
2. Exec. Order No. 13,567, 76 Fed. Reg. 13,277.
3. Id.
4. American Civil Liberties Union, President Obama Issues Executive Order
Institutionalizing Indefinite Detention (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.aclu.org/print/national-
security/president-obama-issues-executive-order-institutionalizing-indefinite-detention. See
also American Civil Liberties Union, Illegal Detentions in the "War on Terror," http://www.
aclu.org/indefinitedetention/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2011).
5. See, e.g., Peter Finn & Anne E. Kornblut, Obama Creates Indefinite Detention
System for Prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2011, http://www.washing
tonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/07/AR2011030704890.html (Executive Order
13,567 creates a "formal system of indefinite detention"); Jim E. Lavine, Unconstitutional
Polices Coming Around Again, THE CHAMPION (Mar. 2011), at 5, available at http://www.
nacdl.org/Champion.aspx?id=15992 (Executive Order 13,567 "institutionaliz[es] a regime of
indefinite detention for detainees"); Military Documents Detail Life At Guantanamo, NPR
(Apr. 25, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/04125/135690218/military-documents-detail-life-
at-guantanamo ("[The executive order ... essentially codifies indefinite detention, though
the administration was careful not to use that language.").
6. See, e.g., Laurie R. Blank, A Square Peg in a Round Hole: Stretching Law of War
Detention Too Far, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 1169, 1169 (2011) (noting that Executive Order
13,567 provides for indefinite detention of Guantanamo detainees).
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categories of detainees at Guantanamo, but this paper only addresses
its legality as applied to those detainees who have been designated for
continued law of war detention. It does not address the legality of the
Order as applied to detainees who have been referred for prosecution,
or who are awaiting transfer or release to a foreign country. In addi-
tion, the Order describes procedures for the periodic review of the
detainees' detention status, but this paper does not address whether
the procedures are legally sufficient. Finally, this paper does not ex-
amine the President's authority to issue the Order. While these issues
are certainly worthy of examination, they are outside the scope of this
paper.
This paper defends the legality of Executive Order 13,567's
standard for continued law of war detention in four sections. Part I
provides background information about the Guantanamo detainees to
whom the Order applies and parses out the applicable language of the
Order. Part II discusses the President's authority for detaining indi-
viduals in continued law of war detention under both the laws of war
and the AUMF. Part III addresses the duration requirement for con-
tinued law of war detention under the laws of war and the AUMF. Part
IV analyzes the legality of the Order's standard by applying the legal
standards of the laws of war and the AUMF. It argues that the Order's
detention standard is lawful because it is narrowly tailored, stricter
than the laws of war and the AUMF, and limits the scope of the Presi-
dent's detention power.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Guantanamo Detainees in Continued Law of War Detention
On September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda terrorists hijacked several
commercial airplanes in a massive and unprecedented attack on the
United States that killed approximately 3,000 people.8 The following
week, Congress passed the AUMF, which authorized the President to
take military action against those responsible for the terrorist at-
tacks.9 Shortly thereafter, U.S. Armed Forces entered Afghanistan
under the direction of President George W. Bush "with a mission to
7. Exec. Order No. 13,567, 76 Fed. Reg. at 13,277 (This order "applies only to those
detainees held at Guantanamo [as of March 7, 2011] ... (i) designated for continued law of
war detention; or (ii) referred for prosecution, except those detainees against whom charges
are pending or a judgment of conviction has been entered.").
8. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004) (O'Connor, J., plurality).
9. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)
[hereinafter AUMFI.
74 FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW Vol. 7:1:71
subdue al-Qaeda and quell the Taliban regime that was known to sup-
port it."10
Between 2002 and 2008, President Bush directed the capture of
779 suspected al-Qaeda terrorists and had them transferred to Guan-
tanamo for detention." While most of these detainees have since been
transferred to foreign countries for detention or release, some still re-
main at Guantanamo.12 The detainees remaining at Guantanamo fit
into one of three categories:
(1) Those who have been detained in order to prevent their return
to the battlefield, i.e. non-penal, preventative detention or contin-
ued law of war detention; 13
(2) Those who have been detained to prevent their return to the
battlefield and have criminal charges pending against them or have
been referred for prosecution;14 or
(3) Those who are awaiting release or transfer to a foreign
country. 15
There are currently 171 detainees at Guantanamo,16 and 48 of
them fall into the first category-continued law of war detention.' 7
These 48 detainees were designated for continued law of war detention
as a result of a comprehensive interagency review of the status of all
Guantanamo detainees mandated by Executive Order 13,492.18 The
final report of the interagency review, issued on January 22, 2010, re-
vealed that "48 detainees were determined to be too dangerous to
transfer but not feasible for prosecution."19 The report concluded that
those 48 detainees were to "remain in detention [at Guantanamo] pur-
suant to the government's authority under the [AUMF] ."20
10. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510.
11. Id. See Dep't of Justice, FINAL REPORT: GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE 1 (2010),
available at http://justice.gov/ag/guantanamo-review-final-report.pdf (632 detainees were
brought to Guantanamo in 2002; 117 in 2003; 10 in 2004; 14 in 2005; five in 2007; and one in
2008).
12. MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 40139, CLOSING THE
GuANTANAMo DETENTION CENTER: LEGAL ISSUES 1 (2011), available at http://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/natsec/R40139.pdf.
13. Id. at 1-2
14. Id.
15. Andrei Scheinkman et al., The Guantanamo Docket, N.Y. TIMES, http://projects.
nytimes.com/guantanamo/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2011).
16. GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE, supra note 11, at 10.
17. Id. at 12.
18. Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,897, 4,898 (Jan. 27, 2009).
19. GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE, supra note 11, at ii.
20. Id.
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B. Executive Order 13,567
President Obama responded to the interagency review's final
report on March 7, 2011 by issuing Executive Order 13,567.21 The Or-
der was issued "to ensure that military detention of individuals . . . [at
Guantanamo], who were subject to the interagency review ... of Exec-
utive Order 13492 .. . continues to be carefully evaluated and justified,
consistent with the national security and foreign policy interests of the
United States and the interests of justice."22 The Order's purpose was
to establish a process for the periodic review of the detention status of
those persons designated for continued law of war detention. 23
The Order defines "law of war detention" as "detention author-
ized by the Congress under the AUMF, as informed by the laws of
war."24 It requires a Periodic Review Board (PRB) to review a de-
tainee's detention status every four years to determine whether
continued law of war detention is warranted. 25 If the PRB determines
that detention of a detainee "is necessary to protect against a signifi-
cant threat to the security of the United States," then the Order
mandates that the detainee is to remain in continued law of war deten-
tion.26 The Order specifically states that "[iut does not create any
additional or separate source of detention authority," or "affect the
scope of detention authority under existing law."2 7 It also expressly
recognizes that Guantanamo detainees have the "constitutional privi-
lege of the writ of habeas corpus," and it does not "affect the
jurisdiction of Federal courts to determine the legality of their
detention."28
21. Exec. Order No. 13,567, 76 Fed. Reg. at 13,277.
22. Id.
23. GARCIA ET AL., supra note 12, at 6. While the Order also applies to detainees
referred for prosecution, except those detainees against whom charges are pending or a
judgment of conviction has been entered, this paper does not address the legality of
continued detention as applied to those detainees.
24. Exec. Order No. 13,567, 76 Fed. Reg. at 13,280.
25. Id. at 13,279.
26. Id. at 13,277.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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III. AUTHORITY TO DETAIN FOR CONTINUED LAW OF
WAR DETENTION 29
The laws of war have long-established that nations engaged in
hostilities may lawfully detain members of the enemy's fighting force
in non-penal, continued law of war detention, without charge or trial,
in order to prevent their return to the battlefield.3 0 This authority
even extends to civilians to the extent necessary for reasons of secur-
ity.3 ' Similarly, according to the U.S. Supreme Court, the President
may detain terrorist enemy combatants (or belligerents) 32 in continued
law of war detention, without charge or trial, pursuant to Congres-
sional authorization in the AUMF.33 Thus, the President may lawfully
capture and detain enemy combatants engaged in hostilities against
the United States in continued law of war detention at Guantanamo,
without charge or trial.34
29. The author of this paper recognizes that there is an argument that the President
may have inherent war powers, as Commander in Chief, to detain enemy belligerents
during wartime hostilities, even absent Congressional authorization. See Hamdi, 542 U.S.
at 516. However, it is unnecessary to examine the extent of this Presidential power because
Congress granted the President this detention authority in the 2001 AUMF. See id. at 521
(O'Connor, J., plurality opinion), 587 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Moreover, President Obama
cited the AUMF as his authority for enacting Executive Order 13,567, and it is widely
recognized that "[wihen the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization
of Congress, his authority is at its maximum." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 635-37 (Jackson, J., concurring). See also Duncan, John C., Jr., A Critical
Consideration of Executive Orders: Glimmerings of Autopoiesis in the Executive Role, 35 VT.
L. REv. 333, 369 (2010) (noting that when the President issues an Executive Order with the
backing of Congress, "such action is well within the President's universally recognized
power"). Accordingly, this paper only addresses the President's detention authority over
enemy belligerents under the laws of war and the 2001 AUMF, not his authority to issue the
Executive Order.
30. See infra Part. II.A.
31. Id.
32. The Bush Administration used the phrase "enemy combatant," in defending these
cases before the federal courts, but the Obama Administration uses the phrase "enemy
belligerent" instead. However, both phrases identify the same class of persons-those
participating in hostilities against the United States. See Harold Hongju Koh, Keynote
Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law in Washington
D.C.: THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Mar. 25, 2010), available at
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm; GARCIA ET AL., supra note 12, at 1.
33. See infra Part II.B.
34. See infra Part II.A-B.
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A. The Laws of War
The laws of war, also known as the law of armed conflict or hu-
manitarian law,3 5 represent a subset of international law.< They
reflect hundreds of years of evolving efforts by nations to reduce the
devastating effects of war on humanity.37 Recognizing that it is un-
likely that warfare itself can ever be completely eliminated, nations
have agreed to conduct themselves in accordance with the laws of war
in exchange for their enemies doing the same.38 The laws of war can
be thought of as the jus in bello just war theory-the law governing
conduct during war.39
The laws of war can be broken down into two branches, one that
governs the rules of engagements during hostilities and one that con-
cerns the treatment of human beings during hostilities.40 The
detention of individuals during hostilities is properly analyzed under
the human rights branch.41 However, the humanitarian rules specific
to detention vary according to whether the armed conflict is classified
as "international" or "non-international,"42 and there is general disa-
greement about the proper classification of the war on terror.43 Yet, for
the purpose of analyzing the continued law of war detention standard
in Executive Order 13,567, the characterization of the war on terror
conflict is immaterial because the Order's detention standard is lawful
even if the detainees are afforded the fullest extent of human rights
protections available under the laws of war.4 4 As such, this paper ana-
35. JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31367, TREATMENT OF
"BATTLEFIELD DETAINEES" IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 10 (2007), available at http://www.fas.
org/sgp/crs/terror/RL31367.pdf. See also Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, War and
International Humanitarian Law (Oct. 2010), http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/
overview-war-and-law.htm.
36. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, supra note 35.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. ELSEA, TREATMENT OF "BATTLEFIELD DETAINEES," supra note 35, at 11.
40. Id. at 10-11 ("The older of the two branches, known as 'Hague law' after the Hague
Conventions of 1899 and 1907, prescribes the rules of engagement during combat and is
based on the key principles of military necessity and proportionality. The humanitarian
side of the law, known as 'Geneva law,' emphasizes human rights and responsibilities,
including the humane and just treatment of prisoners.") (citations omitted).
41. See id.
42. Id. at 12.
43. Id. at 13-15 (explaining the competing scholarly theories regarding the
characterization of the armed conflict between the United States and the Taliban and al
Qaeda).
44. See id. at 12-13 (noting that the full protections of the Geneva Conventions apply to
international conflicts).
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lyzes the Order's standard under the complete protections of the laws
of war-those that apply to international conflicts.
Continued law of war detention has long been a legal practice
during armed conflict under the laws of war.4 5 Detention during war is
recognized by "universal agreement and practice" as an "important in-
cident of war."4 6 The primary purpose of law of war detention is to
prevent enemy combatants "from returning to the field of battle and
taking up arms once again."47 However, it may also be used for non-
fighters, i.e. civilians or non-combatants, if necessary to protect against
a serious breach of security. 48
The Third Geneva Convention, one of the treaties codifying the
laws of war, 49 allows nations to capture enemy combatants and detain
them as prisoners of war (POWs) in continued law of war detention in
order to prevent them from rejoining the enemy in battle.50 This Con-
vention does not require the detaining nation to bring charges against
the POWs during their continued law of war detention because the de-
tention is not penal in nature, only preventative.5' It is not designed to
punish POWs for their participation in hostilities, but to "remove them
from the battlefield."52
Similarly, the Fourth Geneva Convention allows for continued
law of war detention of civilians if "absolutely necessary"53 or for "im-
perative reasons of security."54 While the interning nation must have
serious reasons for believing that the civilians will "cause distur-
bances, or ... seriously prejudice its security,"55 the Convention clearly
contemplates the possibility of continued law of war detention of civil-
ians in these instances. For instance, after the United States invaded
45. See Blank, supra note 6, at 1183.
46. Id. See also Decision of Nuremberg, supra note 1; W. Winthrop, Military Law &
Precedents 788 (rev.2d ed. 1920) ("It is now recognized that . . . '[a] prisoner of war is no
convict; his imprisonment is a simple war measure.'" (citations omitted)); In re Territo, 156
F.2d 142, 145 (9th Cir. 1946) ("The object of capture is to prevent the captured individual
from serving the enemy.").
47. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518 (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942)).
48. Blank, supra note 6, at 1183.
49. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, supra note 35.
50. Blank, supra note 6, at 1184.
51. Blank, supra note 6, at 1184 (quoting Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 42, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]).
52. Id. at 1186.
53. Id. (quoting Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 48, art. 78).
54. Id. at 1186.
55. Id. (quoting Int'l Comm. Red Cross, Commentary on the Geneva Convention (IV)
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Person in Time of War, art. 42, P 1 (1958)).
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Iraq in 2003, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution
allowing for the internment of civilians by coalition forces if "necessary
for imperative reasons of security."5 6 Like the Third Geneva Conven-
tion, the Fourth Geneva Convention does not require the detaining
nation to bring charges against the civilians in order to hold them for
continued detention.5 7 This is because the purpose of this detention is
not to punish the civilians for their conduct, but to protect the intern-
ing nation's security.58
In sum, the laws of war clearly permit continued law of war
detention of both enemy combatants and civilians. They also permit
this detention to continue in the absence of charges or trial by a tribu-
nal. 5 9 By not requiring detention to be accompanied by a cumbersome
judicial process, the laws of war make it easier for nations to comply
with the jus in bello principle of proportionality, which requires na-
tions to use the least amount of force necessary to accomplish their
objectives. 60
B. 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force
Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, a nearly
unanimous Congress approved the 2001 AUMF.61 The AUMF granted
the President the authority to use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that oc-
curred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or
persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism
against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons. 62
While there is no express language in the AUMF allowing for deten-
tion, the U.S. Supreme Court and other federal courts have interpreted
the "necessary and appropriate force" language as granting the Presi-
dent the authority to detain both citizens and aliens fighting against
56. Id. (quoting S.C. Res. 1546, P 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546, Annex 11 (June 8, 2004)).
57. Id. at 1170.
58. Id. at 1186.
59. See Blank, supra note 6, at 1170, 1184.
60. Jasmine Moussa, Can jus ad bellum override jus in bello? Reaffirming the
separation of the two bodies of law, 90 INT'L REV. RED CROss 872, 976 (2008) (noting that the
principle of proportionality encompasses the "fundamental principle that belligerents do not
enjoy an unlimited choice of means to inflict damage on the enemy").
61. Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Construction and Application ofAuthorization for Use of
Military Force, 16 A.L.R. FED. 2d 333 (2011).
62. Id. (quoting AUMF, supra note 9) (emphasis added).
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the United States.63 These Courts have approved such a reading of the
AUMF by recognizing that detention is one of the most fundamental
and acknowledged incidents of war.6 4
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
AUMF as a grant of authority authorizing the President to place cap-
tured enemy combatants in continued law of war detention.65
Although a plurality opinion resulted, a majority of the Court was in
agreement that the AUMF's "grant of authority for the use of 'neces-
sary and appropriate force"' granted the President "the authority to
detain" both U.S. citizens and aliens properly classified as enemy com-
batants.66 The Court reasoned that its understanding of the AUMF's
grant of detention authority was "based on longstanding law-of-war
principles"67 that allowed for such detention to "prevent captured indi-
viduals from returning to the field of battle."68
Importantly, the plurality in Hamdi examined the President's
detention authority under the AUMF as applied to enemy combat-
ants-not civilians, since that was all that was necessary to decide the
case. This narrow ruling, however, certainly does not foreclose the pos-
sibility that the AUMF also permits the President to detain civilians,
or non-combatants, since such detention is permitted under longstand-
ing law-of-war principles,6 9 just like the detention of enemy
combatants. 70 Therefore, while the AUMF's "necessary and appropri-
ate force" language clearly allows the President to detain enemy
combatants,71 it may also allow him to detain non-combatants to the
extent permitted under the laws of war.
IV. DURATION OF CONTINUED LAW OF WAR DETENTION
The laws of war expressly require the release of enemy combat-
ants from law of war detention upon the "cessation of active
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. JENNIFER K. ELSEA & MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., R 41156,
JUDICIAL ACTIVITY CONCERNING ENEMY COMBATANT DETAINEES: MAJOR COURT RULINGS 2
(2011), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41156.pdf (citing Hamdi, 542 U.S.
507).
66. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion), 587 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). See also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 733 (2008).
67. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521.
68. Id. at 518.
69. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 48, art. 42.
70. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520-21.
71. See ELSEA, MAJOR COURT RULINGS, supra note 65.
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hostilities."7 2 While there is no clear or consistent interpretation of
that phrase, the consistent theme among all interpretations is that the
requirement for release is not triggered until fighting forces have left
the battlefield.73 Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the
AUMF grants the President authority to keep enemy combatants in
law of war detention until active combat operations cease.74 Therefore,
in accordance with the laws of war and the AUMF, the President may
lawfully detain enemy combatants in continued law of war detention at
Guantanamo for as long as U.S. combat operations persist against the
Taliban and al-Qaeda.
A. The Laws of War
1. Release Requirement for Prisoners of War
Continued law of war detention for the duration of an armed
conflict is a fundamental and accepted principle under the laws of
war.75 Since the primary purpose of such detention is to prevent the
enemy fighter from returning to the battlefield, 76 it logically follows
that the fighter need not be released and repatriated until the battle is
over.77 The Third Geneva Convention requires the law of war deten-
tion of POWs to cease when no longer necessary.78 Specifically, it
requires their release and repatriation "without delay at the cessation
of active hostilities."7 9 A few federal courts have been faced with the
issue of determining the meaning of the phrase "active hostilities," and
the resulting case law reveals an unclear and inconsistent definition.
In In re Territo,80 the Ninth Circuit suggested that the Third
Geneva Convention's requirement for the release and repatriation of
POWs is not automatic after the fighting is over.81 In that case, a
World War II Italian prisoner argued that the U.S. Army was required
to release and repatriate him because hostilities between the United
72. See infra Parts III.A., III.B.
73. See infra Part III.A.
74. See infra Part III.C.
75. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518.
76. Id.
77. Blank, supra note 6, at 1179 (quoting Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, art. 118
(entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]).
78. ELSEA, TREATMENT OF "BATTLEFIELD DETAINEES," supra note 35, at 49 (quoting
Third Geneva Convention, supra note 72, art. 21).
79. Id. (quoting Third Geneva Convention, supra note 72, art. 118) (emphasis added).
80. 156 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1946).
81. ELSEA, TREATMENT OF "BATTLEFIELD DETAINEES," supra note 35, at 49.
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States and Italy had ceased. 82 While acknowledging that Italy had in
fact left the axis powers and rejoined the war on the side of the allied
powers, the Court summarily rejected the prisoner's argument because
the United States and Italy had not yet negotiated a peace treaty.8 3 In
essence, the Court was of the view that repatriation under the Third
Geneva Convention is only required after there has been an express
agreement between the parties acknowledging the cessation of hostili-
ties.8 4 This interpretation has been recognized as consistent with
international state practice.85
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the
collective body of the laws of war, which includes the Third Geneva
Convention, as allowing for the detention of enemy combatants only for
the "duration of the particular conflict in which they were captured."86
While the Court did not specify what constitutes the end of a "conflict,"
it seemed to imply that the repatriation requirement is triggered once
the battlefield has been abandoned so that there is no opportunity for
the repatriated enemy fighter to take up arms again.87 At first glance,
this interpretation seems to be of the view that the release and repatri-
ation requirement of POWs is self-executing as soon as the battlefield
has been cleared, unlike the Ninth Circuit's holding in In re Territo.88
However, whether this was in fact the view of the Hamdi Court is
highly questionable because the Hamdi Court quoted In re Territo for
support of its interpretation.89 Therefore, the U.S. Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Third Geneva Convention's release and repatria-
tion requirement is uncertain at best and of little help to resolving the
issue of when POWs must be released from law of war detention.
Most recently, in Al-Bihani v. Obama, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals rejected a Guantanamo detainee's argument that his
release was required because the United States' conflict with the
Taliban had ended.90 While the Court doubted the factual accuracy of
82. In re Territo, 156 F.2d at 147.
83. Id.
84. ELSEA, TREATMENT OF "BATTLEFIELD DETAINEES," supra note 35, at 49.
85. Id. (citing DOCUMENTS ON PRISONERS OF WAR, document no. 160, at 796 (U.S. Naval
War College 1979) (noting that it took nearly two years after hostilities between Pakistan
and India ended in 1971 before Pakistani prisoners of war were repatriated).
86. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518 (emphasis added).
87. Id. (noting that "the purpose of detention is to prevent captured individuals from
returning to the field of battle and taking up arms once again").
88. See In re Territo, 156 F.2d at 147.
89. But see Basardh v. Obama, 612 F. Supp. 2d 30, 34 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (noting that
the Hamdi Court only cited the provision in Territo recognizing the limited purpose for
detention, which was to prevent a prisoner from returning to the battlefield).
90. 590 F.3d 866, 874 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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this argument, it also rejected it on practical grounds, noting that
there were still over 70,000 Coalition troops on the ground in Afghani-
stan, with tens of thousands more expected.91 The Court reasoned that
the Third Geneva Convention's use of the phrase "active hostilities" in
the release and repatriation requirement served to "distinguish the
physical violence of war from the official beginning and end of a con-
flict."9 2 The Court stated that this phrase meant that the release of
POWs is required "when the fighting stops."93 By recognizing that coa-
lition ground troops were still present in Afghanistan in rejecting the
detainee's argument, the Court seemed to espouse the view that re-
lease of POWs is only required once the interning nation has
withdrawn its fighting forces from the battlefield.9 4 However, the
Court ultimately refused to rest its holding on this ground, instead the
Court determined that the issue of when hostilities have ceased is a
non-justiciable "political decision" best left to the "Executive's opinion
on the matter."95
In sum, In re Territo suggests that the Third Geneva Conven-
tion does not require the release of POWs absent a formal agreement
between the parties, even when the interning nation's enemy is no
longer a belligerent nation.96 While the view of the Hamdi Court on
this issue is unclear, it is significant that the Court did not expressly
reject or clarify the Ninth Circuit's In re Territo interpretation.9 7 Al-
though Al-Bihani recognized that release is not required so long as
there are troops on the battlefield, it ultimately concluded that the re-
patriation requirement could only be triggered by a determination
from the President that hostilities have ceased.98 While these cases do
not reveal a consistent definition, the one consistent principle among
them is that the laws of war permit law of war detention for at least as





95. Id. (citing Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 168-70 & n.13 (1948) ("[Tlermination
[of a state of war] is a political act.")).
96. See In re Territo, 156 F.2d at 147.
97. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518.
98. See Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 874.
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i. Release Requirement for Civilians and Other Non-Combatants
The Fourth Geneva Convention governs the duration of the law
of war detention of civilians and other non-combatants. 99 Such deten-
tion is permitted so long as the detaining nation seriously believes that
such detention is "absolutely necessary,"100 or "imperative [for] reasons
of security."101 If either determination is made, the detained individu-
als do not need to be released until "the reasons which necessitated
[their] internment no longer exist,"1 02 which should occur "as soon as
possible after the close of hostilities." 03 However, in practical applica-
tion, "as soon as possible" has sometimes been effectuated years after
the cessation of hostilities and signing of peace treaties.10 4
For example, from 1998 until 2000, an international armed con-
flict existed between Ethiopia and Eritrea. 05 The last 95 civilian
internees held by the Ethiopian government were not repatriated to
Eritrea until nearly two years after the parties signed a peace agree-
ment. 06 The peace agreement referenced the Fourth Geneva
Convention's requirement that all civilian internees had to be repatri-
ated without delay after the end of hostilities.107 The International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) praised Ethiopia's repatriation of
the civilians, noting that the repatriation was done in accordance with
the requirements of the Geneva Conventions.108 Therefore, while the
Fourth Geneva Convention requires civilians to be released "as soon as
possible after the close of hostilities," 09 the ICRC has recognized that
99. See Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949: Commentary, http://www.icrc.org/
ihl.nsflCOM/380-600007?OpenDocument.
100. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 89, art. 42.
101. Id. art. 78.
102. ELSEA, TREATMENT OF "BATLEFIELD DETAINEES," supra note 35, at 49 (citing
Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 48, art. 132).
103. Id. (citing Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 49, art. 133).
104. See infra notes 105-108 and accompanying text.
105. Facts and Figures: Eritrea 2008, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS NEWSLE'TER, at 1,
available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/eritrea-newsletter-2008-icrc.pdf
106. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Ethiopia: Release of last prisoners of war and civilian
internees visited by the ICRC in connection with the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea
(Nov. 29, 2002), available at http//www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/mis/5gccla.htm
(last updated Nov. 29, 2002).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. ELSEA, TREATMENT OF "BATTLEFIELD DETAINEES," supra note 35, at 49 (citing
Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 49, art. 133).
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this provision can be lawfully complied with even when done years af-
ter the signing of a formal peace agreement. 110
The repatriation requirement for non-combatant detainees,
similar to the provision covering POWs, makes reference to the end of
hostilities as its triggering requirement."' 1 However, the custom
among nations reveals that this provision can be complied with years
after hostilities have formally ended if done in good faith. 112 Thus, the
repatriation requirement of the Fourth Geneva Convention does not
need to be immediately complied with after the end of hostilities in
order to prevent a violation of the laws of war. Rather, the require-
ment can be fulfilled after formal hostilities have ceased so long as the
repatriating nation has made a good-faith effort under the circum-
stances to comply with the provision.
B. 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force
1. Federal Jurisprudence
As discussed in Part II.B., a majority of the Court in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld concluded that the AUMF's "necessary and appropriate
force" language grants the President the power to utilize law of war
detention. 113 However, the Hamdi Court was less precise in describing
the duration of the President's detention power under the AUMF. 1 14
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals concluded that the Hamdi
Court understood the AUMF as allowing the President to use contin-
ued law of war detention until hostilities have ceased, and not merely
until the detained individuals cease to pose a threat to U.S.
interests.115
In Hamdi, a majority of the Court agreed that the AUMF
granted the President the authority to detain for at least as long as
"United States troops are still involved in active combat in Afghani-
stan."116 Justice Thomas was the fifth Justice to comprise the
110. See Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, supra note 105.
111. ELSEA, TREATMENT OF "BATTLEFIELD DETAINEES," supra note 35, at 49 (citing
Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 49, art. 133).
112. See Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, supra note 105.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 56-63.
114. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509 (since Hamdi only challenged the government's legal
authority to detain him and not the duration of his detention, the Court did not address the
issue of whether there are any durational limitations on the government's detention power.)
115. See infra notes 108-111 and accompanying text.
116. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion), 587-88 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
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majority's conclusion on this point, although he did so in his dissenting
opinion of the case. 117 Justice Thomas opined that the President's de-
tention power was actually broader than that suggested by the
plurality and not limited by the end of "active combat in Afghanistan"
or "the cessation of formal hostilities." 1 8 However, this broad view has
not garnered approval from a majority of the Court.119 To date, a ma-
jority of the Court has only gone so far as recognizing the AUMF's
authorization for the President to detain individuals "for the duration
of the particular conflict in which they were captured."120
In April of 2009, District Court Judge Huvelle decided Basardh
v. Obama and held that the President's power to detain enemy combat-
ants in continued law of war detention under the AUMF depended on
the likelihood of the detainee rejoining the enemy if released.121 Judge
Huvelle stated that Hamdi's interpretation of the AUMF meant that
the President was limited to detaining only those individuals who
would resume fighting on the battlefield if released.122 Judge Huvelle
reasoned that this limited interpretation meant that the President
could not detain an enemy combatant if there was no real threat that
he would return to the battlefield and fight for the enemy. 123 Accord-
ingly, Judge Huvelle stated that the President had the burden of
proving that a detainee presented a threat of returning to the battle-
field in order to justify his continued law of war detention under the
AUMF.124 Judge Huvelle held that the President did not have the au-
thority to continue the detention of the petitioner detainee because it
was undisputed that the detainee had severed all of his ties with the
enemy and presented no real threat of rejoining the battle.125
The following year, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
decided Awad v. Obama and implicitly rejected Basardh's conclusion
that the AUMF requires the President to prove that a detainee poses a
threat of rejoining the battlefield in order to continue his law of war
detention.126 The Awad Court stated that its decision in Al-Bihani' 27
117. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 588 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
118. Id. (citing Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 360 (1952); Johnson v. Eisentrager,
339 U.S. 763, 786 (1950)).
119. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 733.
120. Id.





126. 608 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
127. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 84-88.
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"ma[d]e plain that the United States'[] authority to detain an enemy
combatant is not dependent on whether an individual would pose a
threat to the United States or its allies if released but rather upon the
continuation of hostilities."128 The Court declared that the issue of
"whether a detainee would pose a threat to U.S. interests if released is
not an issue . .. concerning aliens detained under the authority con-
ferred by the AUMF."l 29
Thus, the current interpretation of the President's detention
authority under the AUMF is that he may continue law of war deten-
tion of enemy combatants until hostilities have ceased.130 The AUMF
does not require the President to determine whether or not these de-
tainees pose a threat to U.S. interests in order for him to continue their
detention.131 Rather, the AUMF allows the President to detain cap-
tured enemy combatants until the end of hostilities, even if there is
conclusive evidence showing that the detainees will not return to the
battlefield if released.132
2. The President's View
Consistent with the former Bush Administration, the current
Obama Administration is of the view that the AUMF is Congressional
approval for the President to utilize continued law of war detention for
the duration of the current conflict. 33 However, the Bush Administra-
tion espoused the view that the President's detention power existed
even without the AUMF because of his Commander-in-Chief power in
Article II of the U.S. Constitution. 13 4 Conversely, the Obama Adminis-
tration is of the view that the President's power to detain in a current
conflict stems only from the AUMF's grant of authority.135 Although
the Bush Administration asserted that the President's war powers
were shaped by the laws of war,13 6 it never expressly stated that his
war powers were in fact limited by the laws of war.137 However, the
128. Awad, 608 F.3d at 11.
129. Id.
130. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 733.
131. See Awad, 608 F.3d at 11.
132. See id.
133. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
134. See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
135. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
136. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
137. See infra note 121 and accompanying text.
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Obama Administration has repeatedly stated that his detention power
under the AUMF is limited by the laws of war. 138
The Bush Administration defended the President's power to de-
tain enemy combatants at Guantanamo by arguing that "wartime
detention falls squarely within the Commander in Chiefs war pow-
ers."13 9 It asserted that this power continued "at least for the duration
of a conflict." 140 The Bush Administration pointed to prior military ac-
tions during international conflicts, such as World War II, and internal
conflicts, like the Civil War, to support its view that "the practice of
capturing and detaining enemy combatants in wartime" has deep roots
in U.S. history and warfare itself.141 While the administration as-
serted that the President's use of law of war detention comported with
the laws of war, it did not take the position that the laws of war dic-
tated the scope of the President's detention power.142
Since taking office in January of 2009, President Obama's ad-
ministration has taken the legal position that his authority to utilize
continued law of war detention at Guantanamo stems solely from the
AUMF.143 In fact, the Obama Administration has publicly rejected the
Bush Administration's position that the President has such power as
Commander in Chief.14 4 The administration also asserts that the "au-
thority conferred by the AUMF is informed by the laws of war."145
This position was formulated because of the Hamdi Court's reference
to the laws of war during its interpretation of the AUMF, 146 and Presi-
dent Obama's policy that the United States will conduct its armed
conflicts consistent with international law.147 Thus, the Obama Ad-
ministration's position is that the President's detention authority
138. See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
139. Brief for Respondent at 13, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
140. Id. at 14. See also William Glaberson, U.S. Won't Label Terror Suspects as
'Combatants,' N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 13, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/14/us/politics/
14gitmo.html?adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1322589825-XGHZeqrHVtnl9QttDd7Fg.
141. Brief for Respondent at 14, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
142. See Koh, supra note 32.
143. See id. (emphasizing that the Obama Administration "rest[s] . . . [its] detention
authority on a domestic statute - the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force
(AUMF)").
144. See id. ("[Tihe Obama [aldministration has not based its claim of authority to
detain . . . on the President's Article II authority as Commander-in-Chief.").
145. Brief for Appellees at 23, Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010). See
also Koh, supra note 32 ("[U]nlike the . . . [Bush] [A]dministration, as a matter
of international law, this Administration has expressly acknowledged that international
law informs the scope of our detention authority.").
146. Koh, supra note 32.
147. See id.
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under the AUMF ceases at the cessation of hostilities, as required by
the laws of war. 148
V. ANALYSIS OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 13,567
A. The Order's Detention Standard is Strict & Limits the
President's Power
1. The Scope is Narrowly Tailored
Executive Order 13,567 has limited and specific application. It
only applies to the 48 detainees who were in continued law of war de-
tention on March 7, 2011.149 Thus, its scope is clearly fixed and
expressly states that it is inapplicable to any detainees interned after
March 7, 2011.150 The Order's limited scope suggests that it is nar-
rowly tailored to achieving the President's objective of ensuring that
the detention of these 48 individuals remains "consistent with national
security and foreign policy interests of the United States and the inter-
ests of justice."151
Moreover, the Order is beneficial to the 48 detainees to whom it
applies because its fixed parameters clearly inform the detainees of the
standards by which their detention is governed, which will assist them
in the filing of their habeas corpus petitions. Further, the Order's nar-
row scope provides a benefit for courts handling these habeas corpus
petitions because it eliminates any uncertainty over the government's
authority for their detention.
2. The Standard for Detention is Limited by the Laws of War
The Order's standard for law of war detention is lawful because
it limits the President's detention authority to a level that is both au-
thorized by Congress and permissible under the laws of war.152 Since
the AUMF broadly authorized the President to use "all necessary and
appropriate force . . . in order to prevent any future acts of interna-
tional terrorism"153 without reference to limitations in the laws of war,
148. See id.
149. GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE, supra note 11, at 12.
150. See Exec. Order No. 13,567, 76 Fed. Reg. at 13,277.
151. Exec. Order No. 13,567, 76 Fed. Reg. at 13,277.
152. See Exec. Order No. 13,567, 76 Fed. Reg. at 13,280 ("'Law of War Detention' means:
detention authorized by the Congress under the AUMF, as informed by the laws of war")
(emphasis added).
153. Zitter, supra note 61 (quoting AUMF, supra note 9).
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a reasonable inference is that Congress intended exactly what it said:
that the President was authorized to use all means necessary-even
those that violate domestic law and the laws of war-in order to pre-
vent a repeat of September 11, 2001. Theoretically, this literal
interpretation of the AUMF would have allowed the President to de-
tain any person, under any conditions, even in violation of domestic
law and the laws of war, so long as he deemed such detention to be
necessary to prevent future acts of international terrorism.
However, the Hamdi plurality seemed to reject this expansive
view of Congress' intent for the AUMF by stating that its understand-
ing of the AUMF's grant of detention authority was "based on
longstanding law-of-war principles."1 5 4 The Executive Order plainly
recognizes the Court's reliance on the laws of war in Hamdi because it
expressly defines "law of war detention" as "detention authorized by
the Congress under the AUMF, as informed by the laws of war."1 5 5 It
also makes clear that "[i]t does not create any additional or separate
source of detention authority," or "affect the scope of detention author-
ity under existing law."15 6 The Court has expressly held that the
AUMF gives the President the authority to detain enemy combat-
ants, 15 7 and implicitly approved any other detention that would be
consistent with the laws of war.158 Since the Order does not create
"any additional or separate source of detention authority," it merely
codifies the Court's current interpretation of the President's detention
authority under the AUMF.159 Moreover, the Order limits itself to the
Court's interpretation of the AUMF because it does not "affect the
scope of detention authority under existing law." Thus, the Order's
standard for detention is clearly lawful because it merely codifies the
President's detention authority granted by the AUMF as approved by
the Court.160
3. The Standard is More Restrictive than the Laws of War Require
With respect to enemy combatants, the laws of war permit con-
tinued law of war detention for as long as the interning nation's armed
forces are on the battlefield, even if there is no chance that the de-
154. 542 U.S. at 521.
155. Exec. Order No. 13,567, 76 Fed. Reg. at 13,280.
156. Id. at 13, 277
157. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion), 587 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 733.
158. See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
159. See Exec. Order No. 13,567, 76 Fed. Reg. at 13,277.
160. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 733.
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tained POWs will return to the battlefield if released. 161 The critics of
Executive Order 13,567 acknowledge this longstanding principle, but
they claim that it is unlawful when applied to the war against terror-
ism.162 They conclude that the Order's standard for continued law of
war detention is unlawful because it codifies the standard for contin-
ued detention under the laws of war which is only lawful in a
traditional armed conflict setting. 63
The critics support this conclusion under the premise that the
war against terrorism is different from traditional international armed
conflict because the United States' enemy is not another "nation."164
They assert that this raises significant questions about the geographic
scope of the "battlefield," 6 5 since the enemy is not located within a
single sovereign's borders. They argue that if law of war detention of
enemy combatants were to be allowed to continue until active hostili-
ties cease, then the United States would never have to release the
Guantanamo detainees because the fight against terrorism will likely
never end.' 66 For this reason, they conclude that the Order authorizes
unlawful indefinite detention. 67
This author agrees with these critics' determinations that the
war on terrorism is different from traditional international armed con-
flict in many ways. However, the Order's legal standard for continued
law of war detention is not unlawful because it does not merely codify
the traditional detention standard under the laws of war. Rather, it
requires detention to be both "informed by the laws of war" 68 and "nec-
essary to prevent a significant threat to the security of the United
States."169 As such, it does not allow detainees to remain in continued
law of war detention until U.S. troops have stopped fighting terrorism,
which arguably, might continue forever. Instead, by requiring that the
detainees also present a "significant threat to the security of the
United States," the Order requires the President to release non-threat-
ening detainees even if U.S. troops are still engaged in hostilities
against terrorism.170 Therefore, the Order's standard for continued de-
tention cannot be unlawful for the reason that it merely codifies the
161. See supra p. 13-14.
162. See Blank, supra note 6, at 1173-88.
163. See id. at 1174-79.
164. Id. at 1171.
165. Id. at 1174-79.
166. See id.
167. See id. at 1192-93.
168. Exec. Order No. 13,567, 76 Fed. Reg. at 13,280.
169. Id. at 13,277.
170. Id.
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standard for release of enemy combatants under the laws of war be-
cause it requires the President to release POWs before the laws of war
would require him to do so. 17 1
The Order's standard for continued law of war detention is also
legal as applied to any of the 48 detainees in law of war detention who
were non-combatants when captured. Although it is unlikely that
these persons, who have been deemed "too dangerous to transfer,"172
were non-combatants when captured, the possibility is assumed for the
purpose of demonstrating the legality of the Order's continued deten-
tion standard. The laws of war require civilians to be released from
law of war detention "as soon as possible after the close of hostili-
ties."1 7 3 However, historical examples, like the Ethiopia and Eritrea
conflict, reveal that this requirement can be fulfilled years after the
signing of a formal peace agreement.174 However, the Executive Order
eliminates the possibility of prolonged internment of non-combatants
after the cessation of hostilities because it requires the President to
release non-combatant detainees if they do not present a significant
threat to U.S. security, even if that determination is made before the
close of hostilities.175 Therefore, the Order cannot be unlawful for the
reason that it merely codifies the standard for release of non-combat-
ants under the laws of war because it requires the President to release
non-combatants before the laws of war do.176
Just as the Order's additional threat requirement is not re-
quired for continued detention of enemy combatants or non-
combatants under the laws of war, it is also not required for continued
detention under the AUMF.1 77 The AUMF authorizes continued de-
tention even when it is undisputed that a detainee has severed all of
his ties with the enemy and is no longer a threat to the United
States.178 Therefore, the Order's standard for continued detention can-
not be read as unlawful under the AUMF because it only allows the
171. Compare Exec. Order No. 13,567, 76 Fed. Reg. at 13,277 (only allowing continued
law of war detention for detainees who present a "significant threat to the security of the
United States"), with Awad, 608 F.3d at 11 (holding that the President's authority to detain
enemy combatants "is not dependent on whether an individual would pose a threat to the
United States").
172. GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE, supra note 11, at ii.
173. ELSEA, TREATMENT OF "BATTLEFIELD DETAINEES," supra note 35, at 49 (citing
Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 48, art. 133).
174. See Facts and Figures, supra note 105.
175. See Exec. Order No. 13,567, 76 Fed. Reg. at 13,277.
176. See note 171.
177. See Awad, 608 F.3d at 11.
178. See Id.
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President to continue detention for detainees who pose a threat to the
United States.1 7 9
Thus, claims that the Order institutionalizes indefinite deten-
tion are simply inaccurate. The Order not only encompasses the legal
requirements for continued detention under the laws of war and the
AUMF, 18 0 but it imposes an additional threat requirement that is not
required for legal detention under these laws. 181 The Order's strict re-
quirements for continued detention actually facilitate an end to the
detention of the 48 Guantanamo detainees currently in continued law
of war detention. Accordingly, the Order should be commended be-
cause it creates a definitive standard for the release of these detainees
in an armed conflict with potentially infinite boundaries. 182
B. The Order Reflects the President's Intent to Limit
His Detention Power
Since January of 2009, the Obama Administration has taken
the legal position that the President's detention authority is derived
solely from the AUMF, and not the Constitution.183 It has also stated
that the President's detention authority under the AUMF is limited by
the laws of war.18 4 Thus, the Obama Administration believes that the
President's detention authority under the AUMF can legally continue
until the cessation of hostilities.185 Since hostilities in the war against
terrorism may never cease, there is a possibility that the President's
detention power under the AUMF could persist forever.
The Executive Order signifies an attempt by the President to
limit this possibility. The President could have issued an Order with-
out a threat requirement, one which would have allowed for law of war
detention to continue for as long as allowed by the AUMF as informed
by the laws of war. Such an Order would have allowed for potentially
indefinite detention of detainees who are not a threat to the United
States. Notably though, that was not standard the President created
179. See Exec. Order No. 13,567, 76 Fed. Reg. at 13,277.
180. See id. at 13,280 ("detention authorized by the Congress under the AUMF, as
informed by the laws of war").
181. See id. at 13,277 (detention is only warranted when "necessary to protect against a
significant threat").
182. See Blank, supra note 6, at 1179-84 (suggesting that the war on terrorism will
never end).
183. See Koh, supra note 32.
184. See id.
185. See id.
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in his Order.186 Therefore, the Order's threat requirement reflects the
President's intent to limit his potentially unlimited detention authority
under the AUMF.
Moreover, the Order expressly states that it does not "affect the
jurisdiction of Federal courts to determine the legality of . .. [a de-
tainee's] detention."187 Thus, it does not suspend the 48 detainees'
constitutional right to challenge their detention through the writ of
habeas corpus in federal court.188 Rather, the Order expressly recog-
nizes the judiciary's power to check the President's detention authority
and requires him to release detainees if the judiciary finds that he is
without authority to detain them or if their detention is unlawful.18 9
The Order's reference to the laws of war and the AUMF clearly
reflects the President's intent to limit, rather than expand, his deten-
tion authority over the 48 Guantanamo detainees. Furthermore, its
reference to the detainees' constitutional right of access to the federal
courts indicates the President's intent for their detention to continue
only if consistent with the law.
VI. CONCLUSION
President Obama issued Executive Order 13,567 to ensure that
the continued law of war detention of 48 Guantanamo detainees would
be consistent with the laws of war and the AUMF, and the Order has
successfully achieved those objectives. First, the Order is narrowly fo-
cused on addressing the continued detention status of those 48
detainees. Second, it recognizes that the laws of war and the AUMF
are a limit on the President's detention authority over these individu-
als. Third, the Order's standard only allows for the continued law of
war detention when the detainee is a significant threat to the United
States, which is a requirement not necessary for legal continued deten-
tion under the laws of war or the AUMF. Finally, the Order reflects
the President's intent to limit his detention authority over these de-
tainees and respects the detainees' rights to the federal courts to
challenge their detention. For these reasons, the Order does not insti-
tutionalize unlawful indefinite detention as many critics have claimed.
186. Exec. Order No. 13,567, 76 Fed. Reg. at 13,277.
187. Id.
188. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771 (holding that detainees at Guantanamo have the
constitutional privilege of habeas corpus).
189. Exec. Order No. 13,567, 76 Fed. Reg. at 13,277.
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